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I  want  to  discuss  why  it  makes  sense  to  speak  of  a  linguistic  turn  in  the  philosophy  of  Paul  Ricœur.  He  early  
on  had  said  that  “the  word  is  my  kingdom  and  I  am  not  ashamed  of  it”  without,  at  that  time,  spelling  out  
just   what   this   claim   meant   as   regards   a   broader   philosophy   of   language.   Nor   would   he   have   had   any  
difficulty  in  admitting  that  his  attitude  toward  language  and  questions  about  language  changed  over  time.  
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Résumé: 
Je  souhaite  discuter  pourquoi   il  y  a  un  sens  à  parler  de   tournant   linguistique  dans   la  philosophie  de  Paul  
Ricœur.  Il  avait  dit  dès  le  début  de  son  travail  “la  parole  est  mon  royaume  et  je  n'ʹen  ai  point  honte,”  sans,  à  
ce   moment-­‐‑là,   spécifier   ce   que   cette   affirmation   signifie   au   regard   d'ʹune   philosophie   du   langage.   Et   il  
n'ʹaurait  pas  eu  de  difficulté  à  admettre  que  son  attitude  envers  le  langage  et  les  questions  sur  le  langage  a  
changé  au  fil  du  temps.  
Mots-­‐‑clés:  Philosophie  analytique,  Tournant  linguistique.  
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I  want   to  discuss  why   it  makes  sense   to   speak  of  a   linguistic   turn   in   the  philosophy  of  
Paul  Ricœur.  He  early  on  had  said  that  “the  word  is  my  kingdom  and  I  am  not  ashamed  of   it”  
without,  at  that  time,  spelling  out  just  what  this  claim  meant  as  regards  a  broader  philosophy  of  
language.1  Nor  would  he  have  had  any  difficulty  in  admitting  that  his  attitude  toward  language  
and  questions  about  language  changed  over  time.  What  is  more,  for  those  contingent  reasons  that  
led  to  his  teaching  for  a  portion  of  each  year  in  the  United  States  for  over  a  decade,  he  came  into  
contact   with   analytic   philosophy   and   analytic   philosophers   and   their   various   specialized  
approaches   to   language.   Ricœur   found   here   the   emphasis   that   had   led   Gustav   Bergmann   to  
introduce  the  idea  that  a  linguistic  turn  had  occurred  in  philosophy  overall.  That  this  idea  gained  
wide   acceptance   among   English-­‐‑speaking   philosophers   was   illustrated   by   the   popularity   of  
Richard  Rorty’s  well-­‐‑known  anthology,  The  Linguistic  Turn.2  In  his  introduction  to  this  collection,  
Rorty   suggested   understanding   this   new   emphasis   in   philosophy   as   one  where   “philosophical  
problems  are  problems  which  may  be  solved  (or  dissolved)  either  by  reforming  language  or  by  
understanding  more  about  the  language  we  presently  use.”3  My  question  is  whether  this  notion  
of  a   linguistic   turn  as  Rorty   interprets   it   can  be  said   to  apply   to  Ricœur—and  whether   it   sheds  
light   on   Ricœur’s   own   philosophy   of   language.   My   answer   will   be   that   Ricœur   can—and  
should—be   read   as   taking   seriously   the   second   half   of   this   statement,   especially   insofar   as   it  
suggests  gaining  a  greater  understanding  about  the  language  we  do  in  fact  use,  but  that  Ricœur  
never  believed  that   the  answer   to  every  philosophical  problem  came  down  to   finding  a  way  to  
reform  language.  My  question,  therefore,  will  be  in  what  sense  it  may  make  sense  to  speak  of  a  
linguistic  turn  in  Ricœur’s  thought,  and,  through  this,  why  Ricœur’s  own  version  of  a  linguistic  
turn  is  still  important  for  philosophers  working  today.  
An   initial  answer   to  my  question  about   the   importance  of  Ricœur’s  own  philosophy  of  
language  for  philosophy  today  will  be  negative  if  we  simply  identify  the  idea  of  a  linguistic  turn  
and  a  concomitant   focus  on   language  with  analytic  philosophy.4  Certainly  Ricœur  was   familiar  
with   a   good   portion   of   the   literature   of   this   branch   of   philosophy   through   his   teaching   in   the  
United  States.  This   is  evident   from  the  many  books  coming  from  this  school   to  be   found   in  his  
library  now  gathered  in  the  Ricœur  Archive  in  Paris.5  It  would  also  be  apparent  were  one  to  look  
at  the  syllabi  from  the  courses  he  taught  during  his  time  at  the  University  of  Chicago  now  in  the  
archive.   Many   names   appear   in   the   recommended   readings   for   these   courses—Grice,   Ryle,  
Nelson  Goodman,  Anscombe,  H.  L.  A.  Hart,  J.  L.  Austin,  for  instance—that  do  not  appear  at  all  or  
are   only   mentioned   in   passing   in   his   books   and   essays   written   during   and   after   his   time   in  
Chicago.  Nor  can  we  say  that  Ricœur  ever  really  adopted  the  characteristic  emphasis   typical  of  
analytic   philosophy   that  making   sense   of   the   logical   proposition   is   the   key   to   a   philosophy   of  
language.  There  are  a  number  of  reasons  why  Ricœur  did  not  go  in  this  direction.  First  of  all,  he  
was  not  that  interested  in  logic  as  a  specific  topic  of  inquiry,  what  is  now  called  classical  logic  in  
contrast  to  more  recent  developments  such  as  multi-­‐‑valued  logics  or  even  fuzzy  logics.  Nor  did  
Ricœur  ever  accept   the  goal  of  making  sense  of  ordinary   language  by  showing   that   it   could  be  
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derived   from   an   underlying   logical   atomism.   Nor   did   he   accept   Frege’s   elimination   of   the  
problem  of  predication—I  mean   especially   the  problem  of   existential   predication—through   the  
idea  of  a  predicative  function.6  Given  his  own  theory  of  metaphor,  Ricœur  might  even  have  seen  
a  kind  of  concealed  metaphor  at  work  here  insofar  as  such  a  function  is  generally  said  by  analytic  
philosophers  to  map  a  variable  onto  a  domain.  And  while  he  would  have  respected  the  insights  
into   the   distinction   between   names   and   descriptions   gained   through   the   analysis   of   different  
forms   of   the   logical   structure   of   the   proposition,   it   would   have   been   the   question   of   naming  
rather   than  of   the  possible  distinctions   to  be  drawn  among  kinds  of  names   that  he  would  have  
seen  as  posing  the  more  significant  philosophical  problem.  
Ricœur  did  appropriate  certain  key  terms  from  the  analytic  tradition  and  put  them  to  his  
own  use.  One  can  cite  here  his  use  of  Frege’s  distinction  between  sense  and  reference  in  The  Rule  
of   Metaphor   and   of   Peter   Strawson’s   notion   of   basic   particulars   and   their   role   in   identifying  
reference  in  both  The  Rule  of  Metaphor  and  Oneself  as  Another.7  But  he  never  really  discussed  these  
authors’  arguments  for  these  ideas,  nor  would  he  have  claimed  to  be  using  them  in  just  the  sense  
meant  by  their  original  authors,  were  that  critique  to  be  raised  against  his  use  of  these  notions.  In  
fact,  he  set  aside  the  emphasis  on  sense  and  reference  from  The  Rule  of  Metaphor   in   favor  of   the  
threefold  distinction  between  figuration,  configuration,  and  reconfiguration  in  Time  and  Narrative  
and  any  reference  to  Strawson  pretty  well  disappears  in  his  subsequent  work.8  This  suggests  that  
his  use  of  such  terms  was  more  operative  and  pragmatic,  a  way  of  making  a  point,  than  meant  to  
reflect  a  strong  commitment  to  them  as  unproblematic  concepts.  
Where  then  ought  to  we  locate  a  linguistic  turn  in  Ricœur—and  might  there,  in  fact,  have  
been  more  than  one  of  them?  What  I  want  to  consider  next,  therefore,  is  how  it  does  make  sense  
to  apply   this   idea  of  a   linguistic   turn  to  Ricœur’s  philosophy,  but  also   to  show  that  we  have  to  
understand  Ricœur’s  own  linguistic  turn  not  as  a  simple  change  of  mind  but  rather  as  a  process  
that   unfolds   over   time.   There   are   precursor   non-­‐‑analytic   influences   to   be   found   in   the   already  
cited  reference  to  his  fascination  with  the  spoken  word,  la  parole,  and  in  his  interpretative  studies  
of   the   problem   of   signification   in   Husserl.9   However,   to   give   a   more   definite   specification   to  
Ricœur’s  own  linguistic  turn—and  to  enable  us  to  follow  its  unfolding—I  want  to  propose  that  it  
first   clearly   occurs   at   the   end   of   The   Symbolism   of   Evil   with   the   declaration,   following   the  
hermeneutic   turn   that   occurs   in   this   book,   that   philosophy   needs   to   attend   to   the   fullness   of  
language.10  Such  a  philosophy,  Ricœur  tells  us  there,  is  a  “philosophy  with  presuppositions.  To  be  
honest,  it  must  make  its  presuppositions  explicit,  state  them  as  beliefs,  wager  on  the  beliefs,  and  
try  to  make  the  wager  pay  off   in  understanding.”11  His  readers  know  that  this  conclusion  came  
from  his  project  of  understanding  how  people  in  fact  seek  to  make  sense  of  the  existence  of  evil,  
its  origin,  and   its  possible  end,   through  attending   to   their  use  of  a  confessional   language  when  
they  speak  about  evil.  What  Ricœur  saw  was  that  this  is  a  kind  of  language  that  makes  use  of  the  
notions  of  myth  and  symbol,  where  a  symbol  is  defined  by  the  fact  that  it  always  conveys  more  
than  one  meaning  and  a  myth  is  a  narrative  unfolding  some  of  the  possible  meanings  conveyed  
through  a  symbol  or  a  combination  of  symbols.  Hence  this  is  a  kind  of  language  that  differs  from  
the  ideal  of  the  unequivocal  logical  proposition  or  the  unambiguous  scientific  assertion—and  that  
cannot  be  reduced  to  them.  
Following   this   inquiry   into   a   specific   kind   of   symbolic   language—that   used   to   try   to  
make  sense  of  evil—Ricœur  turned  to  an  attempt  to  generalize  beyond  this  specific  kind  and  use  
of  a  confessional  language,  which  had  to  be  appropriated  by  the  philosopher  though  reenacting  it  
using  one’s  imagination  in  order  to  understand  it,  rather  than  by  some  form  of  logical  analysis.  In  
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sought  to  think  starting  from  the  fullness  of  language  had  to  acknowledge  and  take  seriously  the  
existence  of  figurative  language.  Initially,  this  inquiry  took  the  form  of  trying  to  generalize  from  the  
implicit   theory  of   symbol   and   symbolic   language  used   in  The  Symbolism   of  Evil.  As  we   can   see  
from   the   essays   collected   in   The   Conflict   of   Interpretations,   this   led   to   the   idea   of   a   symbolic  
function   underlying   any   general   system   of   signs   and,   through   this,   to   the   claim   that   any  
philosophy  of   language  must  be  one   that  considered   language  as  one  such  sign  system.12  From  
this  insight  followed  the  recognition  that  a  philosophical  inquiry  into  language  which  would  lead  
to  a  philosophy  of  concrete  reflection  must  be  a  philosophy  that  has  to  start  from  both  what  it  is  
people  say  and  how  they  say  it.  Ricœur’s  search  for  the  fullness  of  language  therefore  had  to  focus  
on  language  in  terms  of  both  its  structure  and  its  use.  This  was  an  enquiry  that  would  be  given  
shape  more  through  his  encounter  with  structuralism  and  structural  linguistics  than  through  his  
appropriation  of  analytic  philosophy.  Indeed,  we  can  say  that  Ricœur’s  own  linguistic  turn  from  
this   point   on   turned   out   to   be  more   influenced   by   developments   in   linguistics   than   it  was   by  
work   in   philosophical   logic   or   even   the   ordinary   language   philosophy   associated  with  Oxford  
and  some  American  philosophers,  although  along  the  way  he  did  draw  several  key  insights  from  
this  work.  
His  next  step  was  the  insight  that  the  theory  of  language  coming  from  Saussure  had  to  be  
expanded   to   include   not   just   a   focus   on   the   structure   of   language   as   a   system   of   signs,   what  
Saussure  called  la  langue.  It  also  had  to  address  language  as  used  in  speaking,  la  parole.  Langue  as  
the  underlying  structure  of  any   language   is  surely  operative   in  speech,  but   it   is  also  something  
abstract,   objectified   as   an   atemporal   methodological   construct   rather   than   derived   from   any  
particular  natural  language  as  actually  used.  Saussure’s  great  discovery  was  to  have  laid  the  basis  
for   a   general   linguistics   but   not   fully   to   unfold   it.  He   did   so   through   postulating   a  model   for  
language  as  a  system  of  signs,  where  the  constitutive  basis  of  this  system  or  structure  lay  not  in  
independently   existing   signs   but   in   the   differences   among   its   signs.   This  meant   that   linguistic  
signs  at  the  level  of  the  lexicon  did  not  exist  independently  of  one  another  but  only  through  their  
relations   among   themselves.   Ricœur   accepted   this   but   was   less   satisfied   with   the   claim   that  
language   as   thus   constituted   was   a   closed   system.   This   claim   was   derived   from   the   further  
assumption   that   the   signs   in   question   had   an   internal   structure   which   divided   them   into   a  
signifier   and   a   signified.   He   saw   that   this   meant   eliminating   any   possibility   of   a   referential  
dimension   to   language,   if   reference  was   to   be   understood   as   about   something   external   to   and  
even   prior   to   language.   Ricœur   took   this   postulated   closure   to   mean   that   in   language   so  
understood   nothing   in   fact   was   said,   hence   there   was   no   meaning   either,   only   perhaps   the  
possibility  of  meaning  if  the  signs  in  question  could  be  shown  to  be  put  to  use  by  someone  to  say  
something   about   something   to   someone   in   some   concrete   situation.   For   Saussure,   this   is  what  
happened  at  the  level  of  speech,  but  since  speech  was  temporal  and  ephemeral,  there  could  be  no  
scientific  account  of  speech  because  it  could  not  be  captured  as  a  fixed  object  for  investigation.  
This   brings   us   to   the   next   moment   in   Ricœur’s   linguistic   turn.   Drawing   on   Émile  
Benveniste’s  assertion  that  an  acceptably  scientific  theory  of   language  as  used  to  say  something  
through  speech  was  in  fact  possible,13  Ricœur  saw  that  a  philosophy  that  intends  to  take  seriously  
the   fullness   of   language   has   to   be   a   philosophy   that   includes   a   theory   of   discourse,   where  
discourse  first  occurs  at  the  level  of  a  sentence,  not  at  that  of  words  in  the  dictionary  or  at  that  of  
the  signs  in  what  Saussure  designated  as  the  formal  system  of  langue.  Pursuing  this  insight  took  
Ricœur  through  a  number  of  subsequent  steps  that  we  can  summarize  as  follows.  First  comes  a  
general  characterization  of  discourse  as  the  use  of  language  by  someone  to  say  something  about  
something   to   someone.   Obviously,   discourse   is   where   language   is   meaningful   in   the   sense  
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Ricœur  was  seeking.  It  says  something  about  the  world,  the  people  in  it,  the  ways  things  are  or  
were,  and  the  ways  they  might  be.  To  this  basic  characterization  of  discourse  next  was  added  the  
insight   that   discourse   too   has   a   structure,   but   it   is   a   structure   that   differs   from   and   is   not  
reducible   to   the   individual   words   that   compose   any   sentence.   A   sentence   is   not   simply   a  
sequence   of  words.   It   too  has   a   structure,   but   this   is   a   structure   constituted   through   the   act   of  
predication.   Given   Ricœur’s   commitment   to   the   fullness   of   language,   this   meant   considering  
predication   as   operative   in   every   form  of  discourse,   not   simply   in   those   assertions   that   can   be  
analyzed   or   reformulated   as   logical   propositions.   Ricœur   was   able   to   draw   on   analytic  
philosophy  in  expanding  this  point.  He  drew  from  the  analytic  philosophy  of  action,  for  example,  
the   insight   that   “action   sentences”   are   ones   that   ascribe   a  meaning   to   an   action   or   assign   the  
action  to  an  agent  rather  than  ones  that  predicate  a  property  to  a  logical  subject.  The  importance  
of  this  point  regarding  the  meaningfulness  of  the  wide  variety  of  kinds  of  discourse  that  can  be  
expressed   already   at   the   level   of   the   single   sentence   is   further   evident   in   Ricœur’s   work   on  
metaphor.  Metaphor,  contrary   to   traditional  accounts,  and  many  contemporary  accounts,   is  not  
simply  a  question  of  substitution  of  one  word  for  another.  Metaphor,  at   least   in  the  case  of   live  
metaphor,  occurs  at  the  level  of  the  sentence  through  an  act  of  impertinent  predication.14  Unlike  
the   logical   proposition,  which   by   definition   is   either   true   or   false   and  must   be   one   of   them,   a  
metaphor   says   something   both   is   and   is   not   the   case   at   the   same   time.   Ricœur   drew   three  
important   conclusions   from   this.   First,   live   metaphors   can   be   a   source   of   new   meaning,   of  
semantic   innovation.   This   is   why,   while   they   can   be   paraphrased,   they   cannot   be   directly  
translated  into  a  literal,  that  is,  a  univocal  or  single  truth-­‐‑valued  logical  proposition,  without  loss.  
Second,   over   time,  metaphorical   expressions   can   enter   ordinary   use;   they   can   become   familiar  
ways   of   saying   things,   and   finally   be   absorbed   into   the   dictionary   through   a   process   of  
lexicalization  that  assigns  new  possible  meanings  to  a  word  or  words  found  there.  In  effect,  live  
metaphors  can  metaphorically  die,  but  dead  metaphors  do  not  really  reveal  the  symbolic  power  
of  live  metaphors  to  suggest  new  meaning.  Third,  because  metaphorical  discourse  is  meaningful,  
intelligible,   a   philosophy   that   takes   the   fullness   of   language   seriously   will   have   to   take   into  
consideration  the  possibility  of  a  metaphorical   truth.  This   is  a   truth  that  redescribes  reality   in  a  
new  way,  unlike  the  descriptions  that  are  captured  by  the  logical  proposition’s  ability  to  assign  
an  existing,  already  recognizable  property  or  relation  to  an  already  known  subject  term.  
Furthermore,  metaphors   can  extend  beyond   the   length  of   a   single   sentence,   as   can  any  
instance   of   discourse.15   Hence   the   symbolic   function   and   possibility   of   semantic   innovation   at  
work   in  metaphor  may  also   carry  over   to   examples  of   such  extended  discourse,  discourse   that  
involves   more   than   a   single   sentence.   The   next   step   in   Ricœur’s   exploration   of   language   as  
discourse,   therefore,   was   to   turn   to   this   idea   of   extended   discourse,   where   such   extended  
discourse  may  carry  the  redescriptive  capacity  found  in  a  live  metaphor.  Ricœur’s  discussion  of  
extended  discourse  places  us  at  the  heart  of  his  philosophical  hermeneutics  and  what  it  has  to  say  
about   the  nature  of   the   text,  where   it   is   a   text   or   anything   that   can  be   construed  as   a   text   that  
serves  as  the  model  of  how  to  fix  discourse  by  inscribing  it  for  investigation,  something  Saussure  
failed  to  see.  It  also  introduces  all  the  problems  associated  with  interpreting  the  meaning  of  a  text  
or  set  of  texts  that  are  relevant  to  any  consideration  of  Ricœur’s  hermeneutical  theory.  However,  
in   considering  how   it   is  possible   to   see   a   linguistic   turn   in  Ricœur,   and  how   this  differentiates  
him  from  work  done  in  analytic  philosophy,  I   think  it  better  here  to  keep  the  focus  on  what  he  
has  to  say  about  the  more  general  idea  of  discourse,  which  includes  uses  of  language  not  written  
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As  already  stated,  discourse  first  occurs  at  the  level  of  the  sentence,  not  that  of  the  word.  
Words   in   the   dictionary   are   polysemic,   they   usually   have  more   than   one  meaning,   and   those  
meanings  may  differ  greatly  among  themselves.  It  is  discourse,  the  act  of  saying  something  that,  
so  to  speak,  filters  these  meanings  through  the  act  of  predication  without  necessarily  producing  a  
univocal   statement.   Most   discourse,   in   fact,   is   plurivocal,   not   univocal,   but   not   for   all   that  
unintelligible.  Indeed,  the  idea  of  a  univocal  act  of  discourse  may  be  at  best  a  regulative  idea.  This  
is   why   there   is   always   a   question   of   interpretation   that   arises.   This   need   for   interpretation   is  
further  complicated  by  the  use  of  the  same  act  of  discourse  to  say  different  things  or  to  say  the  
same  thing  in  different  situations.  But  that  there  may  always  be  a  contextual  factor  to  consider  is  
not  what  is  most  important  about  what  Ricœur  says  about  discourse,  particularly  with  regard  to  
work   that   is   yet   to   be   done.  What   is   important   for   understanding   the   fullness   of   meaningful  
discourse  is  that  the  forms  of  extended  discourse  can  be  catalogued  in  terms  of  different  genres  or  
types  of  extended  discourse.  Hence  a  theory  of  discourse  needs  to  attend  to  these  different  forms  
and   what   accounts   for   their   specificity   as   a   form   of   discourse.   Of   course,   it   also   needs   to  
acknowledge   that  any   instance  of   extended  discourse  within   such  a  genre   is  unique   in   its  own  
way;  it  has  a  style  that  individualizes  it  which  also  needs  investigation.  And  genres  of  discourse  
can   overlap,   intersect,   and   even   be   intermingled,   complicating   the   act   of   interpreting   their  
meaning.  Obviously,   looking  ahead,  questions  remain  open  about  all  these  points.  I  mean  more  
still  needs  to  be  said  about  how  one  recognizes  different  forms  of  extended  discourse,  how  one  
accounts   for   their  specificity,  and  how  one  makes  sense  of  what   is  said  through  them,  either   in  
their  pure  form  or  in  combination  with  other  forms  of  extended  discourse.  
To   indicate   that   these   questions   remain   open,   I   want   to   briefly   list   the   six   kinds   of  
extended  discourse  Ricœur  considered  and  to  say  something  about  how  he  characterized  them.  
As  we  shall   see,   in  no  case,   except  perhaps   for  narrative,   can  his   characterization  be   said   to  be  
anything  like  complete.  In  fact,  in  every  case,  more  needs  to  be  said  about  how  what  is  identified  
actually  works,  even  if  his  insight  into  what  is  central  in  that  type  of  discourse  is  already  a  useful  
contribution   to   our   making   sense   of   both   the   form   of   discourse   in   question   and   the   larger  
question  of  a  general  theory  of  the  fullness  of  language.  
Given   time,   I   believe   one   can   distinguish   six   forms   of   extended   discourse   in   Ricœur’s  
various  discussions   of   the   fullness   of   language.   They   are   poetic   discourse,   narrative  discourse,  
religious  discourse,  political  discourse,  legal  discourse,  and,  most  problematically,  philosophical  
discourse.   Poetic   discourse   is   the   broadest   form,   the   one   closest   to  what  Ricœur   thought   of   as  
expressing  a   symbolic   function.  As   such   it   is  discourse   in  which   semantic   innovation,   something  
new  being  said  for  the  first  time,  occurs.16  In  this  sense,  it  can  be  present  in  all  the  other  forms  I  
have  enumerated  insofar  as  they  are  all  capable  saying  something  new.  Narrative  discourse  is  the  
form   discussed   at   the   greatest   length   by   Ricœur   and   perhaps   the   form   most   familiar   to   his  
readers.  It  is  constituted  by  the  fact  that  it  has  a  plot  that  configures  what  was  already  figured  in  
existing  language,  particularly  the  language  that  provides  a  network  of  concepts  used  to  identify  
and   talk   about   human   action.   Narrative   discourse   is   discourse   that   configures   a   series   of  
episodes,   where   something   may   or   may   not   happen,   into   a   single   story   or   history,   where  
something  meaningful  does  happen.  As  such,  narrative  discourse  is  a  necessary  form  of  discourse  
in  that  without  it  we  cannot  really  make  sense  of  time,  in  all  its  complexity,  or  even  the  meaning  
of   action  over   time,   even   if   the   solution  achieved   is  practical   rather   than   theoretical,   to  use   the  
Kantian  distinction.  Famously,  looking  at  narrative  discourse  also  led  Ricœur  to  the  discovery  of  
the  idea  of  a  narrative  identity,  a  topic  that  is  not  at  issue  here  but  that  needs  to  be  acknowledged  
insofar  as  it  is  a  component  of  his  investigations  into  the  fullness  of  language.  
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Religious   discourse   is   a   kind   of   second-­‐‑order   discourse   that   can   make   use   of   many  
different  forms  of  extended  discourse,  for  example,  narrative,  law,  prophecy,  lamentation,  praise,  
wisdom,  proclamation.  It  is  a  kind  of  poetic  discourse,  one  whose  specificity  stems  from  the  fact  
that  at  least  for  the  biblical  traditions,  it  serves  to  name  God  and  to  proclaim  a  message  of  hope,  
through   what   Ricœur   calls   its   logic   of   superabundance.   Political   discourse   is   specified   by   its  
fragility  owing  to  its  inherent  rhetorical  nature  and  its  tie  to  ideology  as  a  way  of  both  resolving  
and  concealing  its  claim  to  authority  as  the  power  to  command  others  and  to  make  a  legitimate  
use   of   force   and  violence.17   In   a  word,  political  discourse   is   both   itself   conflictual   and   a  use  of  
language  meant  to  resolve  conflicts,  where  the  question  as  to  who  should  rule  and  why  or  even  
how  can  always  be  reopened.  At  the  limit,  it  is  closely  tied  to  the  question  of  what  constitutes  the  
social  bond  that  allows  people  peacefully  to  live  together.  
Legal  discourse  is  perhaps  the  least  clearly  distinguished  form  of  extended  discourse  in  
Ricœur’s   philosophy   of   language,   but   something   like   at   least   a   first   specification   of   such  
discourse  can  be  discerned   in  Ricœur’s   late  essays  on   the   just  where  he  draws  on  what  he  had  
learned   about   how   the   trial   court   operates   from   his   participation   in   a   series   of   seminars  with  
lawyers  and  judges.18  He  sees  the  specificity  of  this  form  of  discourse  to  lie  in  the  role  assigned  to  
a  neutral   third  party  who  has   to  pass   judgment  when   there   is  a  dispute  or   tort  or  crime,  along  
with   the   rules   governing   what   counts   as   evidence   and   argumentation   in   pleading   for   such   a  
judgment  in  the  setting  of  the  trial  court.  
Philosophical  discourse,  finally,  is  the  most  problematical  form,  and  the  one  least  directly  
addressed   by   Ricœur,   although   we   can   find   a   few   hints   concerning   it   in   his   work.   It   is  
problematic  because  it  is  the  discourse  that  formulates  his  theory  of  discourse.  Hence  it  runs  into  
all  the  problems  that  find  their  analogues  on  the  side  of  analytic  philosophy  regarding  sets  that  
include  themselves;  I  mean,  for  instance,  Russell’s  paradox  that  derailed  Frege’s  attempt  to  derive  
mathematics   from   logic   or   the   still   broader   question   whether   a   language   can   contain   its   own  
metalanguage   or   is   condemned   to   an   open-­‐‑ended   sequence   of   such   metalanguages.19   Ricœur  
suggests   two   things   about   such   philosophical   discourse   that   are   worth   noting.   First,   it   is  
characterized   by   reflexivity.   Philosophical   discourse   can   be   discourse   about   discourse.   Ricœur  
understands  this  problem  of  reflexivity  in  a  larger  sense  than  simply  a  question  of  how  language  
allows  us  to  use  language  to  talk  about  language,  however.  We  can  see  this  in  those  places  where  
he   invokes  his  allegiance  to   the  French  tradition  of  a  reflexive  philosophy  tracing  back  through  
Nabert  to  Fichte  and  Maine  de  Biran,  where  what  is  at  stake  is  the  very  fact  that  human  existence  
is  characterized,  even  constituted  by  the  capacity  for  self-­‐‑reflection.  That  we  know  that  we  know,  
understand  that  we  understand  is  very  puzzling  and  still  something  difficult  to  explain.  It  is  his  
commitment   to   this  wider  problem  of   reflection  or   reflexivity   that   sets  a   limit   to  Ricœur’s  own  
linguistic   turn.   It   is  why  he  came  finally   to  see   that  while  philosophy  must  attend  to   language,  
that   this   is   a   necessary   and   unavoidable   step   for   contemporary   philosophy,   simply   paying  
attention   to   language,   even   to   the   fullness   of   language   is   not   sufficient   for  what   is   at   stake   in  
philosophy.   It   is   why   he   could   say   that   “not   everything   is   language…   but…   nothing   in  
experience  arrives  at  meaning  unless  it  is  borne  by  language.”20  It  is  also  why  he  was  willing  to  say  
that  at  the  limit  philosophical  discourse  is  finally  a  kind  of  speculative  discourse,  albeit  one  that  
does  not  make  a  claim  to  being  absolute,  why  any  ontology  will  itself  be  a  hermeneutic  ontology.  
More  could  and  should  be  said  about  all   this,  of  course,  but   the   limits  of   space   impose  
themselves.   Let   me   conclude   therefore   by   suggesting   that   in   looking   back   at   the   philosophy  
produced  by  Paul  Ricœur  over  the  course  of  a  long  life,  there  is  a  philosophy  of  language  to  be  
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the   last   century  or  more,   that  what  he  has   to   say  about   the  nature  of   language  and   its  use   is  a  
significant   contribution   to   this   topic   in   that   he   takes   seriously   the   wide   range   of   problems  
involved  in  acknowledging  the  fullness  of  language.  I  would  especially  emphasize  here  what  he  
has  to  say  about  the  fact  of  linguistic  change,  semantic  innovation,  new  meaning,  something  not  
really  addressed  in  the  analytic  tradition.  Taken  to  its  limit,  this  insight  leads  me  to  conclude  that  
Ricœur’s   own   linguistic   turn   with   its   emphasis   on   taking   seriously   the   fullness   of   language,  
including   figurative   language,   sets  us   the   task  of   reopening   the  question  what  do  we  mean  by  
literal  language?21  This  is  language  that  we  philosophers  may  take  too  much  for  granted,  if  not  as  
simply  given  and  unproblematic.22  
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21 To the best of my knowledge, Ricœur only directly addresses this question in one place in The Rule of 
Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1977): “We did admit of course that the metaphorical use of a word could always be 
opposed to its literal use; but literal does not mean proper in the sense of originary, but simply 
current, ‘usual’” (290–91). An attached endnote refers to Aristotle, Poetics, 1457b, where Aristotle 
says, “By the ordinary (kurion) word I mean that in general use in a country.” Ricœur adds that, for 
Aristotle, the “proper” (idiom) sense has nothing to do with “some sort of primitive sense (etumon)” 
(362–63n66). 
22 Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the session on “Ricœur at 100” at the 2013 World 
Congress of Philosophy held in Athens, Greece, and to the 2013 Annual Meeting of the Society for 
Ricoeur Studies, held in Eugene, Oregon. I wish to thank those present on those occasions for their 
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